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This study evaluates the policy effect of the reformation of municipal hospitals in Japan.
We focused on the efficiency improvement of not only the hospital itself but also separate internal
organizations of a hospital. Hospitals have two heterogeneous internal organizations: the
medical-examination section and administration section. The administration section carries out
business management and the medical-examination section provides medical care services. We
employed a dynamic and network data envelopment analysis model. The model makes it possible
to estimate both the efficiencies of separate organizations and the dynamic changes of the
efficiencies simultaneously. We found that there are positive policy effects. Additionally, we
should focus on the administration section rather than the medical-examination section in
reforming municipal hospitals in Japan.
Dynamic and network data envelopment analysis model, municipal hospital, efficiency,
production function
Japanese municipal hospitals have faced financial
crises for decades. In 2007, the Japanese government set
guidelines for the reformation and facilitated restructure
of hospital business by municipals. There are 9000
hospitals in Japan, half of which are owned by private
not-for-profit organizations and half of which are run by
public organizations. One thousand public hospitals are
owned and operated by municipal governments, most of
which have been in the financial red for a long time.
Because Japanese local governments have huge
cumulative deficits, they require municipal hospitals to
have a sound financial foundation.
Harris [1] pointed out that a hospital can be considered
two separate firms, in that it has two heterogeneous
internal organizations: a medical-examination section
and administration section. The administration section
carries out business management activities to contain
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medical expenses within medical revenue. The
medical-examination section provides various medical
care services. These two organizations are
mutual-exchange internal services. The administration
section provides medical beds to the
medical-administration section, and the
medical-examination section repays the revenue through
the use of medical beds for inpatient services.
Japanese hospitals have acute beds and long-term-care
beds in various ratios. The large hospitals tend to
concentrate on acute care services. In addition,
physicians and surgeons belong to hospitals and are paid
by hospitals as in the case of National Health Service
hospitals in the United Kingdom. These physicians
provide services not only to inpatients, but also to
outpatients at the same hospitals.
Many problems that arise in municipal hospitals in
Japan are in the form of a failure of the
medical-examination section. The chief medical officer
in charge of the medical-examination section is typically
the target of criticism from the stakeholders of the
hospital. The administration section tends to operate
from behind closed doors and avoids blame for any
failures. However, there has been no comparison of
efficiency improvements between the administration
section and medical-examination section. This study
evaluates policy effects considering efficiency scores not
only for the whole hospital organization but also for the
administration section alone.
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a nonparametric
method used in operations research to evaluate the
efficiency performance of decision-making units
(DMUs). It is a popular method with which to estimate
the efficiency of hospitals [2]. Several previous studies
have evaluated the efficiency of Japanese hospitals by
DEA [3–7]. These studies used cross-sectional data of
Japanese public hospitals and adopted mainly traditional
DEA. The average D efficiency scores ranged from 0.8
to 0.9.
The purpose of this study is to assess the effect of
reformation since 2007 and to consider further
countermeasures to financial problems of Japanese
municipal hospitals. The structure of this paper is as
follows. The background and purpose of our study were
discussed in this first section. The methods and data of
analyses are discussed in the second section. The results
of the analyses are presented in the third section. After
the estimation of efficiency for our sample, we report D
efficiency scores. The last section includes a discussion
of the results and a view of future challenges.
The traditional DEA model is often considered a
“black-box” (BB) model, because it does not take
account of the internal structure of DMUs. In contrast,
the network DEA model can evaluate DMUs considering
the internal transactions within a DMU using link
variables. [8,9]. On the other hand, the dynamic DEA
model can measure the efficiency score obtained from
long-term optimization using carry-over variables, while
the traditional DEA only focuses on a single period
[8,10].
We could use network DEA to estimate sectional
efficiencies in two sections of Japanese hospitals.
However, in that case, we would not be able to observe
efficiency changes in the two sections separately.
Alternatively, we could employ dynamic DEA to
observe efficiency change at the hospitals. However, we
would not be able to differentiate efficiency scores for
the two sections. Therefore, we cannot observe the
dynamic changes in efficiency for two sections
separately using either dynamic DEA or network DEA.
2. METHOD AND DATA
2.1. Dynamic and network DEA
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The dynamic and network DEA model (DN model)
takes into account the internal heterogeneous
organizations of DMUs for which divisions are mutually
connected by link variables and trade internal products
with each other. Additionally, each DMU has carry-over
variables that take into account a positive or negative
factor in the previous period. This model has the huge
advantage of being able to evaluate the policy effect on
the individual divisions of each DMU. We thus employ a
dynamic DEA model involving a network structure
proposed by Tone and Tsutsui [11]. This DN model with
both link variables and carry-over variables can evaluate
(1) the overall efficiency over the entire observed term,
(2) dynamic change in the term efficiency and (3)
dynamic change in the divisional efficiency. We can
estimate the efficiency of each section individually and
observe dynamic change simultaneously. Applying the
DN model to Japanese hospital data, we illustrate the
suitability of the DN model by highlighting advantages
of the DN model over the traditional BB model.
The data used in the empirical investigation are for
113 municipal hospitals in the period from 2007 to 2009
in balanced panel form. There are about 1000 municipal
hospitals in Japan. However, there is huge heterogeneity
among these hospitals. We selected municipal hospitals
with more than 300 beds. Therefore, this sample may
represent large acute hospitals owned by Japanese
municipals. The data are collected from Annual
Datebook of Local Public Enterprise published by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. It is a
legal requirement for the local chief executive of
municipals to submit audited financial statements to the
ministry. Therefore, the data should be accurate. This
accuracy is required for DEA that does not consider
measurement errors in the data.
The objective function of the administration section is
to realize a sound financial situation through labor inputs
and capital inputs. The objective function of the
medical-examination section is to provide a certain
amount of medical service using hospital beds that are
maintained by the administration at the same hospital.
The inputs, outputs, links and carry-over of the DN
model are described below. For Division 1
(administration section), we adopted two labor inputs
and two capital inputs. As labor inputs, we used both the
number of administration officers and the number of
maintenance officers. All labor inputs are full-time
equivalents (FTEs). As capital inputs, we used both the
interest cost for financial arrangements and the subsidy
from the municipal to cover deficits. For the output of
Division 1, we adopted the balance ratio of medical
expenses to medical income; the break-even point has a
value of 100 and a surplus has a value exceeding 100.
For Division 2 (medical-examination section), we
adopted four labor inputs: the number of doctors, number
of nurses, number of assistant nurses and number of
medical technologists. All labor inputs are full-time
equivalents (FTEs). As the outputs of Division 2, we
adopted the number of inpatients per operation day, the
number of outpatients per operation day and the number
of beds in emergency units. It would be peculiar to
include outpatients as an output of hospitals. In Japan,
there is no gate-keeping system involving general
practitioners. Therefore, hospitals accept a large number
of outpatients to ensure potential inpatients. The number
of beds in emergency units is used as a surrogate variable
for emergency care service because we could not make a
distinction between emergency-care patients and
ordinary patients from the data source.
2.2. Empirical Data
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We set the number of beds as a link variable from
Division 1 to Division 2. We assume that Division 1 is in
charge of the funding and maintenance of medical beds.
Division 1 supplies these beds to Division 2. Division 2
uses the medical beds and delivers medical care services
to patients. In contrast, we set "average revenue per
inpatient per day" as a link variable from Division 2 to
Division 1. We assume that the average revenue is the
consideration to be paid to Division 1 for the beds from
Division 2 (Fig. 1).
We adopted a "fixed link", which means linking
activity is kept unchanged. It would be quite unusual that
the medical-examination section negotiates with the
administration section to change the number of beds. The
administration section has an incentive to maximize
medical revenue and to activate all available beds. The
average revenue per inpatient may represent the density
of medical care services and is not negotiable between
the two sections.
We set the balance account of the public enterprise
bond (hospital bond) as undesirable (bad) carry-over.
The hospital bond was chosen as carry-over because
municipal hospitals issue the bond to raise funds for
capital investment in hospital beds. The municipal
hospital gradually redeems the issued bond from the
surplus of hospital business.
Newly built hospitals are more attractive to patients
but are a heavier fiscal burden in terms of repayment of
the principal. Therefore, the account of the public
enterprise bond as carry-over accurately reflects the
competitive condition of the market in which patients
can freely access any hospital in the Japanese health care
system.
The inputs and outputs of the BB model are exactly
the same as those of the DN model. There are eight kinds
of inputs and four kinds of outputs. The variable for links
and carry-over do not apply in the case of the BB model
(Fig. 2).
Inputs and outputs of the BB model
Inputs and outputs of the DN model
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According to the principle that a public hospital is
expected to accomplish a policy goal with a minimum
budget, we selected an input-oriented model. We adopted
both constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns
to scale (VRS) models in the analysis. Descriptive
statistics of all variables in the analysis are provided in
Table 1.
Table 2 and 3 presents key statistics of estimated
efficiency scores obtained by the DN model and the BB
model. On the Table 3, the first column gives the D
efficiency score of the overall hospital organization as
determined by the DN model. The second column gives
the D efficiency score of the administration sections of
the sample hospitals. The third column gives the D
efficiency score of the medical-examination sections of
the sample hospitals. We can compare efficiency scores
obtained with the DN model with the scores obtained
with the BB model in each year. The comparison
highlights four findings about the policy effect on
Japanese municipal hospitals.
First, the average overall efficiency obtained with the
DN model was 0.798 (CRS model) and 0.854 (VRS
model) in the case of 2007. In contrast, the average
overall efficiency in 2007 estimated by the BB model
was 0.962 (CRS model) and 0.977 (VRS model) and thus
higher than that estimated by the DN model. In the same
year, the ratio of efficient DMUs was 71.1% as
determined by the BB model (CRS model, 2007), which
was higher than the ratio determined by the DN model.
According to the DN model, the ratio of efficient DMUs
was 21.1%. The DN model was thus better able to detect
inefficient DMUs than the BB model. The difference is
due to the structures of the BB model and DN model.
The average efficiency score estimated by the DN model
is similar to the average efficiency estimated in previous
studies on Japanese municipal hospitals
[3],[4],[5],[6],[7].
Second, the dynamic change in efficiency scores from
2007 to 2009 is slightly less in the case of the BB model.
The average efficiency score was 0.962 for 2007 and
0.960 for 2009 (CRS model). In contrast, the average
efficiency score was higher in the case of the DN model.
The average efficiency score was 0.798 for 2007 and
0.811 for 2009 (CRS model).
Basic description of variables
3 RESULTS
Table 1:
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N u m b er o f ad m i n is t ra t ion o f f i ce r s perso n
N um b er o f m a i n te na n c e o ff ic e rs perso n
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B a l an ce ra t io o f m e d ic a l e xp en se
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N um b er o f be d s fo r em e rg e n cy
u n it e s u ni te
A v e ra ge re ve n u e p e r in p a tien t
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B a l an ce a cc ou n t o f th e pu b li c
e n te rp r is e bo n d thousa nd Y en
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D efficiency scores obtained with the BB model
We drew a tentative conclusion about the policy effect
considering both the long-term change and
heterogeneous internal organizations. It would be
misleading to use the change in average efficiency scores
determined by the BB model in evaluating policy effects.
The advantage of the DN model is that it allows
countermeasures to be taken separately for individual
internal organizations of the individual hospital with
heterogeneous internal structure.
Third, in the case of the BB model, it was impossible
to differentiate efficiency between internal organizations.
Because of the advantage of the network structure in the
DN model, we can observe the efficiency change
separately for different internal organizations using that
model. The average estimated efficiency of the
administration section changed from 0.779 for 2007 to
0.773 for 2009 (CRS model). In contrast, the average
efficiency of the medical-examination section improved
from 0.817 for 2007 to 0.849 for 2009 (CRS model). The
direction of efficiency change differed for the
administration section and medical-examination section.
In detail, these results suggest that the policy effect
would be positive for the medical-examination section on
average.
D efficiency scores obtained with the DN model
Additionally, we investigated the individual hospital in
terms of the relationship between dynamic changes for
the two separate divisions. We examined the relationship
between the efficiency scores in 2008 for the two
sections using a scatter diagram (Fig 3).
Scatter diagram of estimated efficiency
scores of the administration section and
medical-examination section (2008 financial year)
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Despite the sections having similar average
efficiencies, there was considerable difference in
efficiency scores of the two sections on a case-by-case
basis. Efficient DMUs on the administration side were
sometimes quite inefficient on the medical-examination
side, and vice versa. We thus could not confirm a clear
relationship between the efficiency scores of the two
sections.
In the case of the DN model, we can observe changes
in the dynamic efficiency separately for each internal
organization. The change in efficiency over the study
period was relatively small in terms of the average value
for each division. However, the situation was different
for an individual municipal hospital.
Efficiency change from the 2007 financial
year to the 2009 financial year in each section
Figure 4 gives the numerical value of the dynamic
efficiency change from 2007 to 2009 for each section
separately. There were 53 hospitals (46.9% of sample
hospitals) for which both divisions improved their
efficiency score. Conversely, there were 19 hospitals
(16.8% of sample hospitals) at which both divisions had
worsening efficiency scores. There were 41 hospitals
(36.7% of sample hospitals) at which the direction of
efficiency change differed for the two divisions; among
them, 27 hospitals had a worsening efficiency score for
the administration section (65.8% of 41 hospitals). There
were certain sizes of sample hospitals for which there
was a decrease in efficiency in the administration section
and improved efficiency in the medical-examination
section. It would be misleading to use only the change in
average efficiency scores to evaluate the policy effects.
The advantage of the DN model is that it allows
countermeasures to be taken separately for each internal
organization of the individual hospital with
heterogeneous internal structure.
There are two heterogeneous internal organizations in
Japanese municipal hospitals. In this study, we estimated
the dynamic change of efficiency scores of Japanese
municipal hospitals in terms of the two divisions. The
first division was the administration section, which is
responsible for financial management. The second
division was the medical-examination section, which
provides medical services directly. The purpose of this
study is to assess the change in the dynamic efficiency of
the two internal organizations separately.
We employed the DN model presented by Tone and
Tsutsui [11]. According to the results, we obtained three
policy implications. First, the dynamic change in
efficiency scores from 2007 to 2009 was a slight increase
in the case of the DN model. On average, we would
admit a positive policy effect on Japanese municipal
hospitals.
Second, the average efficiency change of the
administration section was negative. In contrast, the
average efficiency of the medical-examination section
improved. These results suggest that the policy effect on
the medical-examination section would be positive on
average. We would also need to focus on the efficiency
improvement of the administration section in the future.
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Third, when we looked at individual hospitals, an
efficient DMU on the medical-examination side was
sometimes quite inefficient on the administration side,
and vice versa. The ratio of sample hospitals at which
both divisions improved their efficiency score was
46.9%. Conversely, the ratio of sample hospitals at
which both divisions had worsening efficiency scores
was 16.8%. The ratio of sample hospitals at which the
direction of change differed for the two divisions was
36.7%. Among these hospitals, the majority had a
worsening efficiency score for the administration section.
It would be misleading to use the change in average
efficiency scores to evaluate policy effects.
From the obtained results, we note that we should
focus on the administration section rather than the
medical-examination section in reforming municipal
hospitals in Japan. We also should consider taking
separate countermeasures for different internal
organizations of Japanese municipal hospitals.
This study is the first empirical application of the DN
model, and there are thus limitations in this research. For
example, we could not use both the variables of the
"quality" of medical services and "severity" of patient
conditions. Therefore, we assumed that the sample
hospitals would be homogeneous in terms of quality of
service and severity of patient conditions. We did narrow
the range of samples according to the number of hospital
beds to ensure the homogeneity of sample hospitals on
some level. We should also examine omitted variables;
e.g., the presence of large and costly medical devices
such as magnetic resonance imagers (MRIs). However, it
is difficult to introduce criteria for determining which
device should be included in the input or output of the
production function. Any future study will require a
larger sample set and a more complicated model.
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